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Abstract—The design of secure circuits in emerging tech-
nologies is an appealing area that requires new efforts and
attention as an effective solution to secure applications with
power constraints. The paper deals with the optimized design
of DPA-resilient hiding-based techniques, using Tunnel Field-
Effect Transistors (TFETs). Specifically, proposed TFET imple-
mentations of Dual-Precharge-Logic primitives optimizing their
computation tree in three different ways, are applied to the
design of PRIDE Sbox-4, the most vulnerable block of the
PRIDE lightweight cipher. The performance of simulation-based
DPA attacks on the proposals have shown spectacular results in
security gain (34 out of 48 attacks fail for optimized computation
trees in TFET technology) and power reduction (x25), compared
to their CMOS-based counterparts in 65nm, which is a significant
advance in the development of secure circuits with TFETs.
Index Terms—VLSI design of cryptographic circuits, side-
channel attacks (SCAs), information security, low-power, dual
precharge logic (DPL), substitution box (Sbox), sense amplifier
based logic (SABL), emerging technologies, TFET
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the scaling of CMOS technologies has
significantly reduced power consumption reaching a practical
limit, since the scaling of the supply voltages in order to reduce
the dynamic power consumption, while maintaining adequate
speed, is counterbalanced by the exponential growth of the
leakage currents. In order to address the demanding consump-
tion and performance constraints in new applications, as it is
the case of portable devices, wearables, etc., the dimensional
and functional scaling of CMOS technologies must be pushed
beyond what Moore’s Law allows. In this sense, the advent
of emerging devices (”beyond-CMOS”) allows the scaling up
of integrated circuits and the increase of their performance
beyond what is established in Moore’s Law. This, ultimately,
leads them to complement or replace CMOS technologies.
The so-called ”steep-slope” devices, which are characterized
by inverse sub-threshold (SS) slopes below 60mV/dec, the
physical limit for CMOS technologies at room temperature,
are now receiving a great deal of attention. The reduction of SS
allows the threshold voltage to be reduced without increasing
the leakage current excessively, obtaining high ratios between
the ON current (ION) and the OFF current (IOFF), resulting
in highly energy-efficient circuits with extremely low supply
voltages and low power consumption. The Tunnel Field-Effect
Transistors (TFET) are the most studied steep-slope devices
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[1], [2]. The particular characteristics of these devices are
showing great advantages for secure low-power applications
[3], [4].
It is important to notice that, although cryptocircuits im-
plement mathematically secure algorithms, their physical im-
plementation, regardless of the used technology, leaks side-
channel information that could be used by third parties to
reveal private data, through the well known side-channel
attacks (SCAs) [5], [6]. Among SCAs, those exploiting power
consumption (Differential Power Analysis, DPA attacks [5])
have been positioned as some of the most powerful attacks
due to their effectiveness and low cost. The security of cryp-
tographic circuits against DPA is determined by their resilience
against attacks, where the main objective is to obtain the
secret key or information processed by the device, using power
consumption as an attack vector during encryption/decryption
processes. To counteract DPAs, a wide range of countermea-
sures have been proposed. These countermeasures can be
applied at different abstraction levels, going from algorithm
(higher level of abstraction) to those applied at gate level
(lower abstraction). The ones targeting directly the source
of information leakage, this means to try to have the same
power consumption during operation regardless of the data
being processed, are the hiding countermeasures at gate level,
applied to the lower level of abstraction. Among them, Dual
Precharge Logic (DPL) styles have been posed as the ones
with the best security metrics if properly implemented [7], [8].
The main objective of this paper is to propose and evaluate
advanced DPL-based countermeasures to obtain the highest
security levels using the advantages provided by emerging
technologies, most specifically, with TFETs.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the
security proposal is presented. Section III exposes the security
evaluation of the proposed countermeasures and attack results.
Finally, the conclusions are depicted in Section IV.
II. SECURITY PROPOSAL
TFET stands out as the best positioned of a wide range
of emerging devices [9]. The potential of these transistors to
operate with a reduced supply voltage and, therefore, achiev-
ing significant power and energy compared to conventional
MOSFETs or FinFETs in applications requiring moderate
operating frequencies, has been shown in [10], [11]. On the
other hand, speed advantages have also been demonstrated in
applications with severe limitations on power dissipation or
energy consumption [12], [13].
The use of TFETs has been shown to have a positive
impact on hardware security, being able to provide superior
security in integrated circuits. In [14] and [15], it is highlighted
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that TFETs can help improve circuit design resilience against
power analysis attacks while still preserving low power con-
sumption compared to their CMOS counterparts. The impact
that the specific characteristics of TFETs impose from a
circuit design perspective has been explored in [16], [17], and
involves modifications in the direct migration of CMOS circuit
topologies to a TFET-based design style. Especially relevant to
this work is the impact of circuit operation effects associated
to the low conduction of the n-type (p-type) TFET transistors
with negative (positive) drain to source voltage.
The use of DPL logic styles to achieve the same power
consumption during operation has been demonstrated to be
extremely secure if symmetrically placed and routed [7], [8],
[18]. An extra security level can be added to these logic
styles if some modifications are applied in the Differential
Pull Down Network (DPDN) structure [8]. The optimization
of the DPDN, and hence the overall security level of the
gate, was improved by setting at the same voltage the internal
nodes of the DPDN. Due to the voltage differences in the
internal nodes of the DPDN branches (see nodes n1 and n2 in
Figure 1), the evaluation of the next stage of both differential
branches starts at different voltage values causing information
leakage exploitable by DPA attacks [8]. Unfortunately, the
migration from CMOS structures to TFET implementations
is not straightforward, and a redesign process is needed to
adequate the correct functionality of the TFET gates. As
studied in [15], using as Differential Pull Up Network (DPUN)
a modification of SABL logic style using TFET devices,
achieves high security levels even with a great reduction in
power consumption compared to their conventional CMOS
counterparts. This security level in DPL-based CMOS circuits
can be improved including some optimization in the DPDN
structure [8]. The main goal of this paper is to adapt the
methodology followed in [8] but using TFET devices, which
is not straightforward due to the unidirectionality of TFETs.
The design methodology of the optimized DPDN structure
using TFET devices adapts the two approaches presented in [8]
for CMOS technologies: i) equalizing the voltage values after
evaluation phase in the internal nodes n1 and n2 using the
single− switch (P) solution, and ii) setting the voltage value
in n1 and n2 at the same VDD value using the double−switch
(2P) solution [19]. In the adaptation to TFET technology, the
single− switch solution (P) requires two transistors because
of the characteristic unidirectionality of TFETs. This way, the
equalization of voltages in n1 and n2 is possible in both
directions, while in a hypothetical solution that uses only one
transistor, the conduction would be impossible in one of the
two possible directions. In Figure 1, the DPDN optimization
schematic using SABL logic style as DPUN is shown.
III. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In [15], [19], it was demonstrated that DPL-based DPA
resistant gates are good candidates to replace CMOS counter-
parts for low-power secure systems against DPA attacks. This
paper aims to demonstrate that additional countermeasures, as
the ones presented in [8], [19] can also be implemented in
TFET, with competitive security-cost trade-off. As a demon-
strative vehicle we use the lightweight block cipher PRIDE
[20], which uses a 64-bit input plaintext and a 128-bit key for
the encryption in a total of 20 operation rounds. Concretely,
our attack is focused on the 4-bit substitution box (Sbox-4)
that this cipher implements. Many DPA attacks address their
threats to this non-linear block to retrieve, in groups of bits,
the secret key of block ciphers [6], [8]. The Sbox-4 included in
the PRIDE block cipher is a 4-bit input (x0−x3), 4-bit output
(y0 − y3) combinational block described by the equation (1):
y3 =x1⊕ x3x2
y2 =x0⊕ x2x1 (1)
y1 =x3⊕ y3y2
y0 =x2⊕ y2y1
Thus, for the configuration of this Sbox-4 we need four 2-
input XOR/XNOR and four 2-input AND/NAND SABL gates.
To analyze and compare the suitability of the modifications
proposed in section II for TFETs, we use four different
configurations:
• Classic: Classic SABL [7] implementation for a 65nm
commercial technology from UMC foundry (UMC65)
and its adaptation for TFETs [15].
• P: P modification for both XOR/XNOR and AND/NAND
gates in UMC65 [8], [19] and its adaptation for TFETs
presented in this work.
• 2P: 2P modification for both XOR/XNOR and
AND/NAND gates in UMC65 [8], [19] and its
adaptation for TFETs presented in this work.
• P2P: P modification for AND/NAND gates and 2P mod-
ification for XOR/XNOR gates and its adaptation for
TFETs, since in [8], [19], the authors demonstrated the
better suitability of P modification for AND/NANDs and
of 2P for XOR /XNORs.
In order to provide a fair comparison between these two very
different technologies, we have designed the DPDN blocks
using the minimum transistor width, while in the DPUN
blocks we have maintained the same aspect ratio in both
technologies, with the minimum transistor width that ensures
the proper operation of the logic gates that constitute the
Sbox-4. As benchmarking, we carried out transient simulations
for 5000 randomly generated plaintext patterns for all the 16
possible keys for 4-bit Sbox. Nominal Vdd (Vdd = 1.2 V for
UMC65 and Vdd = 0.3 V for TFETs) and T=27 ºC have been
used to perform these experiments. In terms of performance
measurements, we have captured the peak of maximum power
consumption (Max. Power), the average power consumption
(Avg. Power) in a clock cycle, the average delay (Avg. Delay)
in the output, the power-delay product (PDP) and the duty
cycle. These results have been captured using SPECTRE elec-
trical simulations, as a part of the CADENCE environment. It
is important to notice, that we do not aim to directly compare
these two technologies, especially in terms of performance
figures of merit. Our objective is, rather, to determine if our
implementations with TFET technology and its corresponding
modifications present an overwhelming better security level
that justify the differences in terms of performance. This way,
due to the the higher nominal Vdd, we expect that power
figures are worse from the classical UMC65 compared to those
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Fig. 1. TFET SABL structure schematic with DPDN 2P/P optimizations.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY RESULTS FROM ATTACKS OVER UMC65 AND TFET TECHNOLOGIES USING P, 2P, AND P2P MODIFICATIONS.
Tech. Proposal Max. Power(µW ) Avg. Power(µW ) Avg. Delay(ns) PDP(fJ) Duty Cycle(%) Min. MTD Avg. MTD Failed Attacks
TFET
Classic 3.01 0.86 1.02 0.87 28.46 189 2175.56 5
2P 3.98 1.04 1.23 1.29 23.01 491 4437.63 11
P 2.96 0.89 1.04 0.92 28.94 4992 4999.50 15
P2P 3.32 0.96 1.15 1.10 25.01 500 3014.33 8
UMC65
Classic 228.14 21.05 0.67 14.16 35.34 5 45.31 0
2P 339.03 25.88 0.75 19.40 32.73 35 1531.25 3
P 220.30 21.83 0.67 14.63 35.71 6 77.56 0
P2P 253.23 23.50 0.72 16.85 33.55 64 1131.19 0
from emerging TFET technology. For the same reason, the
performance figures presented (delay, duty cycle) should be
better in the classical approach compared to the emerging one,
since a higher Vdd allows a faster switching of transistors,
which is especially important in the use of digital logic gates.
In terms of security, we have analyzed the different Sboxes
composed of the logic gates that we have modified in both
technologies from an attacker-friendly scenario. This means
that we have set an ideal environment where we avoided the
presence of any noise in order to establish a fair comparison
where other factors apart from the technology and the mod-
ifications of each implementation do not interfere with the
final security result. To carry out our DPA attacks, we have
used a Hamming Distance power model running a MATLAB
routine that follows the procedure presented by [6], [8], [15].
Although the use of dynamic logics presenting evaluation and
precharge phases, could lead to think that a Hamming Weight
model is more appropriate to find correlations between power
and data, the memory effect present in n1 and n2 makes
the Hamming Distance a more suitable model to retrieve the
correct key, by performing such correlations. To compare the
security level achieved by the several Sboxes implemented,
among the widely used range of evaluation metrics available,
we use the number of Measurements to Disclose (MTD) the
correct key. Concretely, in Table I we include the average MTD
over the 16 possible keys, as well as the minimum MTD to
have an idea about the worst case attacks. Taking into account
that our attack applies 5000 patterns to retrieve the correct
key in each case, we have included a column that represents
the number of attacks that are not able to disclose the correct
key (failed attacks) out of the 16 possible keys from the 4-
bit Sbox. In these cases, the MTD considered for these keys
is MTD = 5000, although probably in some cases the result
would have been MTD >> 5000.
Table I shows the main results obtained for the different
technologies and implementations. As summary, we can con-
clude that the modifications proposed for both technologies
improve the security results. Concretely, the implementation
that better works for the classic UMC65 technology is the
one that incorporates 2P modification in both AND/NAND
and XOR/XNOR gates, with an MTD x33.80 better compared
to the classic proposal in this technology. A good result is
obtained also by the P2P proposal with an MTD x24.97 better.
However, the P implementation only outperforms the results
obtained by the classical proposal on a factor of x1.71.
In the case of the emerging TFET technology, the best
implementation in terms of security is the one that presents the
P modification, which shows an Avg. MTD = 4999.50 (x2.29
compared to regular SABL), but with only one successful
attack out of the different 16 keys. For this reason, the Avg.
MTD can be misleading, since probably the real value is quite
higher, but we decided to use MTD = 5000 when the attack is
not successful as we are not able to ensure the exact number
of patterns required to have a successful attack. Nonetheless,
we can ensure that MTD >> 5000. On other issues, P and
P2P implementations also outperform the numbers achieved
by the regular SABL proposal (x2.04, and x1.39). In terms
of a security comparison between both technologies, we can
conclude that TFET technology is more suitable for the
use in this kind of security applications, not only because
when comparing best cases from both technologies TFETs
outperform the result obtained by UMC 65 in a factor x3.27,
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but also because we are not able to retrieve the correct key in
many cases (39 out of 64) with 5000 patterns, while for the
UMC65 only 3 attacks out of the total 64 fail.
In terms of performance, for both technologies the 2P
modification worsen the results obtained by the classic im-
plementation in around a 21% in all performance and average
power measurements for TFETs, showing a PDP value a 48%
worse than in the classic implementation. For UMC65, the
power consumption figure is a 23% worse, while the delay
and the PDP values are a 12% and a 37% worse respectively.
For the P implementation, the results are very similar to
those obtained by the classical approach, it is possible to
observe a slight improvement in the duty cycle value, while
the delay, power (and obviously, PDP) are negligibly higher
due to the inclusion of a higher number of transistors. This
way, P proposal clearly outperforms classic SABL in terms
of security, while having very similar performance figures for
TFETs. In the middle, we can find P2P modifications that
present worse statistics in a range of 6-11% concerning power,
delay and duty cycle output, while the PDP is worse in a 19%
in the case of UMC65, and a 26% for TFETs.
Finally, if we compare generally both technologies, we
clearly observe much superior power figures of merit for the
emerging technology TFET when compared to the classical
UMC65, having roughly x25 times less power consumption.
On the other hand, UMC65 outperforms TFET concerning
figures as the delay or the duty cycle with factors near
to x1.5 and x1.25, respectively. However, in the trade-off
between power consumption and delay, the PDP figures show
how clearly TFET surpass UMC65 with figures roughly x15
times superior. Although we have already commented that the
comparison between both technologies would never be fair
and direct because of the different characteristics as the supply
voltage Vdd, these results where TFET clearly obtains better
figures of merit in terms of security and power consumption
state that TFET technology is a clear contender to take into
consideration when designing lightweight security applications
in the immediate future.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The paper has addressed the use of TFETs in the optimized
design of three different proposals for the DPDN block of
DPL structures, of recognized strength against DPA attacks,
consisting in the elimination of residual charge in internal
nodes of the tree: proposals named as P, 2P and P2P. The low
conduction effects of the (p)nTFET with (positive) negative
voltage from the drain to the source have been taken into
account for the adaptation of the reference SABL structure,
in the realization of XOR/XNOR, AND/NAND and OR/NOR
gates. The proposals have been applied in the design of the
Sbox-4 block of the PRIDE cipher, that have been fully char-
acterized. Simulation-based DPA attacks on different Sbox-
4 have been performed, showing stunning gains in security
and power reduction, compared to the counterparts realized in
65 nm CMOS technologies. Particularly, a x15 improvement
in power-delay figures are found, with a variable gain in
security figures ranging from a minimum of x2, with a big
amount of failed attacks for TFET proposals. As future work,
the corroboration of security via Mutual Information Analysis
(MIA) or Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), will be
performed. As main conclusion, there is room enough for new
increments in security by using emerging technologies in low-
power secure applications.
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